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The English Constructive Trust:
A Look Into the Future
D. W. M. Waters*
I. INTRODUCnON
It is still something of a surprise to American lawyers that the
principle of unjust enrichment is not yet commonly recognized in
English law as being the underlying theme of the so-called quasi-
contract at law, and as being the basis for the remedying of much
unconscionable conduct in equity. While Americans tend to think
of this recognition as the battle of the 1930's, and have long since
moved on to debate the situations wherein unjust enrichment exists.
English lawyers are still much concerned with the nature of the
various remedies, and indeed with the question of their adequacy.
This is not to say that English law lacks remedies to deal with the
areas of liability that American lawyers bring within the heading of
Restitution. In view of the history of the common law and of equity,
a history shared by all common law jurisdictions, it would be nonsense
to say that English law does not offer the deprived plaintiff relief.
Of course, it does. What we have not been willing to do, however,
is to rationalise the miscellany of remedies that exist. And, since we
have not been prepared to rationalise, there are inconsistencies be-
tween and within remedies, and a marked lack of development,
particularly on the equity side. This has long been the complaint
of the English lawyers who, since Lord Wright's first writings and
speeches in the late 1930's,1 have looked for an avowed rationalisation
on the basis of unjust enrichment, and for the adoption of the title,
Restitution.
On a previous occasion,2 the writer explored the present state of
English thinking on the nature of the constructive trust, attempting
to show that, if English law is to adopt a new approach to the
constructive trust and treat it as a purely remedial device, a funda-
mentally different approach has to be made. The prime difficulty
* Reader in English Law, University College London, University of London, Eng-
land; Visiting Professor, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1965-1966. M.A., B.C.L.,
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1. See WRIGnT, LEGAL EsSAYS AND ADDRSSES (1939). See also 51 HAuv. L. REV.
369 (1937).




English lawyers, particularly Chancery lawyers, seem so often to
have is in seeing what is wrong with the present institutional con-
structive trust. The writer also attempted to show how English law
might move to the remedial device, and suggested some useful pur-
poses which such a device might immediately perform. On this oc-
casion it is intended to examine from the author's viewpoint some of
the ideas which his earlier writing provoked, and so to demonstrate
something of the thinking which is currently taking place in England.
In particular, the writer would like to follow up the interesting view
of Mr. J. D. Davies, put forward in The Law Quarterly Review,3 that
the constructive trust should be a flexible remedy where the pro-
prietary aspect of the constructive trust is not emphasized, and where,
though the remedy may be available, the right to trace does not neces-
sarily arise.4
Overall, this paper aims to take a broad look into the future, examin-
ing what path English law might most usefully follow in the place it
gives to the constructive trust.
II. THE RATiONALIzATION OF REMEDmS
If rationalization along the lines of unjust enrichment and restitution
were to be recognized, many areas where law and equity have not
been synthesized since the Judicature Acts5 would appear in a new
light, and constructive thinking would inevitably be focused not only
on the results of historical accident, but on the kind and degree of
restitution we wish to see in specific situations.
For example, it is quite clear that while a man should be able to
recover his property from another who has wrongfully deprived him
of it, it is a different question whether that man should have priority
over the general creditors of the wrongdoer. And, if priority over
creditors is in general permissible, it is yet a further question whether
all creditors should be placed in a position inferior to the man who is
attempting to recover. These are policy questions involving a number
of considerations, and historic remedies will not always take cog-
nisance of them. They will assist some plaintiffs and not others. There
may be no remedy at all, 6 there may be historic limits to the relevant
remedy,7 or though recovery is possible, the remedy may award
3. Davies, Book Review, 81 L.Q. REv. 594 (1965).
4. Mr. Davies was kind enough to set out his view, as it appears here, in a sub-
sequent letter to the writer. The interpretations and views recorded in this paper are
the writer's own, of course, for which he alone is responsible.
5. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Viet., ch. 66 (amended by 38 &
39 Vict., ch. 77 (1875)).
6. See Bell v. Lever Bros., Ltd., [1932] A.C. 161, 224 (separate opinion).
7. The action for money had and received can only lie where a contract can be
implied.
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priority over creditors merely because it happens to be proprietary
rather than personal.
Indeed, as the remedying of unjust enrichment comes gradually into
focus, the remedies themselves must be constantly re-examined so that
they can be made to bring out the substantive issues. And we have
to re-examine the borders that we have assigned to the remedying
of unjust enrichment.
It is arguable that an express trust beneficiary, who is capacitated,
sui juris and able to wind up the trust, but merely keeps it going for
tax purposes, should not always have priority over the general
creditors of the fraudulent and insolvent trustee. The beneficiary8
took a risk that the trustee would conduct the affairs of the trust
honestly, and the creditor who advanced money on loan or gave credit
took the risk that the debtor would manage his affairs with honesty.
Both men entered into a business transaction; they took commercial
risks. Why should the trust beneficiary in these circumstances have
priority over the insolvent trustee-debtor, who has not the funds to
meet both calls? Surely, it is said, the creditor could have taken
security, but so could the trust beneficiary. Should not the trust
beneficiary have looked with as much care for a suitable trustee to
manage his affairs as the creditor should have looked for a secure
investment for his money?
Yet in this example, even a doctrine of restitution would simply
disclaim responsibility.9 The obligations of the trustee and the benefi-
ciary towards each other spring from the express trust, and when
the beneficiary calls for his property out of the insolvents assets, he
is not seeking to rectify unjust enrichment, he is enforcing his rights
under the express trust. This does not seem at all satisfactory. One
can see a case where the beneficiary had no hand in appointing the
particular trustee, where the beneficiary is incapicitated in some way
or even where he is unable to wind up the trust. But to argue that
the trust, whatever its terms or purpose on the particular occasion, is
a working concept independent of unjust enrichment remedies, and
that this right of priority is an aspect of the trust's operation, seems'
as arbitrary as telling the man who lends money for an ultra vires
activity that he cannot have an action for money had and received
because a contract cannot be implied. Are restitutionists happy with
this explanation? But, it is said, where would the trust be if the
beneficiary could not look to automatic priority over the trustee's
creditors. Even in a part common law, part civil law jurisdiction like
South Africa, it is regarded as cardinal to any trust concept, whether
8. He may be the settlor.
9. The law of restitution is commonly associated with those rights of action that
are founded upon the prevention of unjust enrichment.
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or not that concept is expressed through the medium of legal and
equitable estates, that the trust beneficiary must be able to attach the
trust property in the insolvent trustee's hands. Yet, one must ask,
does the trust require that the beneficiary prevail in all circum-
stances?
What gives cause for concern about the automatic priority of the
trust beneficiary, and particularly the beneficiary just mentioned, is
that logically once the principle of unjust enrichment is avowed, it
ought not only to provide alternative remedies, but possibly deny
remedies in other substantive fields of obligation. How far the
principles of restitution carry into other substantive fields, and alter
the effect of the availability or non-availability of existent remedies, is
something we need constantly to reconsider. The existing remedies
arising out of a transaction, be it sale, mortgage, or trust, may be
adequate when one is considering the mutual obligations of the
parties to that transaction; but they may well be unsatisfactory when
the question concerns one party to that transaction and a stranger
to it. Why should the unsecured creditor, particularly if he has given
credit or a loan because of the borrower's apparent means, find him-
self faced both with a trust, of which he neither had nor could rea-
sonably be expected to have had notice, and with a trust beneficiary
who claims the priority of a secured creditor? If the identifiable trust
property has increased in value, while the trustee's own property
has depreciated, restitution principles would award that increase to
the trust beneficiary.
Where there is no express trust, however, and the question is
simply whether A should be able to call for legal title to property
which is presently vested in B, remedies can still be random, though
we are now within the accepted domain of Restitution. If B is solvent,
it does not much matter whether recovery of value is sought in law or
equity. Historic jurisdictions of law and equity, and the relative
efficacy of the available remedies where jurisdiction is concurrent, are
of little practical concern, though the array of remedies may be
inelegant and cumbersome.' 0 But where B is insolvent, the position
is quite different. Are the other creditors to give way to A so that he
may take that to which he claims title, and leave the creditors to
divide what, if anything, remains?
That policy issues arise here at every stage is evident, and it is
possibly tedious for the American reader to have these simple proposi-
tions set out once more. No envious English reader of the Restatement
10. There is the occasional area like mistake where the remedy in equity is better, but
this is an anomaly which ought to be put right. There can hardly be a case for the
perpetuation of the present position. Why not make the only remedy rescission?
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of Restitution" can but admire the clean lines of the personal and
proprietary remedies discussed there. Nevertheless, even in the
Restatement an English lawyer finds the perpetuation of the time-worn
nomenclature, the quasi-contractual remedies and the constructive
trust. Is this inevitable? One can find the underlying principle of all
these remedies, and draw up a classification which emphasizes those
situations where unjust enrichment occurs and where it is or ought to
be remedied; but if, because of the precedents, the remedies have to
retain their old names, the chains of the past remain to distract and
sometimes to confuse. The action for restitution applied in Degiman
v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada2 and County of Carleton v. City of
Ottawa 3 is on this score much more appealing. Here is a wholly fresh
title, free of associations, where the substance of the claim is immedi-
ately uppermost. We have little as yet to tell us what the Canadian
courts are going to make of it, but the potential is obvious. How-
ever, and this is my point, the American lawyer is quite clear that by
a constructive trust or an equitable lien, he has in mind remedies
which permit the plaintiff to recover, to impose a charge upon,
ascertainable property, the limit to his recovery being principally the
bona fide purchaser for value and defendant's change of position.
English law has not developed the remedial constructive trust,14
and therefore the questions which we pose are likely to differ con-
siderably from those of American lawyers. In the view of English law,
the constructive trust is an institution very like the express trust.
The constructive trust is seen to arise by operation of law, but in most
English eyes it arises when one person is under an existent obliga-
tion to hold ascertained property for another. And it does not
matter how that obligation has come into existence. When there is a
contract for the sale of land, the rights and duties of the parties are
fully laid down by the law of contract and land law. Yet we add
gratuitously that between contract and sale, the vendor's obligation to
convey the land when title has been shown is very like the obligation
of the express trustee to hold property for the beneficiary. On the other
hand, the holder of the property may simply have acquired title by
fraud. Every civilized jurisprudence remedies this situation, and in
England there are remedies in both law and equity to secure compen-
sation or restitution. Now the basis of undoing fraud may very well be
to prevent unjust enrichment, .but we do not find any need to go that
far. Fraud is unconscionable on any basis. We are content to say, when
fraudulent acquisition is proved, that the holder's obligation to hold
11. RESTATENMNT, RESTiTUTION (1937).
12. [1954] Can. Sup. Ct. [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785.
13. 52 D.L.R.2d 220 (1965).
14. WATFs, op. cit. supra note 2.
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prior to restoration for the deprived person is much like the obligation
of the express trustee. In other words, whether a transaction creates
obligations independent of unjust enrichment, or obligations arising
from an unfair withholding of property from a plaintiff (which
situation is completely capable of rationalization in terms of preventing
unjust enrichment), the constructive trust merely means that by the
application of existing remedies the defendant has an obligation which
is like the fundamental obligation of the express trust.
This type of reasoning is, of course, arid, but it is as old as our
law of trusts, and property lawyers have grown up with the present
nomenclature. It is a useful shorthand. How then do we get away
from it, and on to the high road of the remedial constructive trust?
III. THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AS A GENERAL REMEDY, EMBRACING
BoTH PERSONAL AND PROPRIETARY CLAIMS
One line of approach is to "take the bull by the horns" and argue
that wherever an equitable remedy now lies, the object of which is to
prevent unconscionable retention of benefit, the underlying principle
is the prevention of unjust enrichment. Such an approach requires the
assembly of all those various situations where equity intervenes to
prevent the unconscionable withholding of gain.
In their recently published treatise on English law, The Law of
Restitution,15 Messrs. Goff and Jones have brought together the
following situations:
Mistake
1. Assisting trustees who have paid under a mistake of
fact.
2. Assisting trustees and personal representatives who
have overpaid beneficiaries by mistake of law.
3. Assisting individuals who have paid an officer of the
court under mistake of law.
4. Perfecting gifts of subsequently incapacitated donors
when by mistake donation has been made to the
wrong person.
Fraud
1. Remedying one person's acquiescence in an improve-
ment to his property made by another, who is ig-
norant of the true ownership.
2. Preventing the utilisation of the Statue of Frauds as
15. GoFF & JoNis, R TrTxoN (1966). The writer has assembled the following
list from the topics discussed in various places in the work.
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a means of perpetuating fraud. (The remedy of spe-
cific performance will be available when there is part
performance of an oral contract.)
3. Dissolving unconscionable bargains.
4. Preventing fraud on creditors (largely overlaid now
by statute.)
5. Compelling trustees to contribute inter se following
a successful action for breach against one.
Coercion
1. Preventing undue influence.
Illegality
1. Setting aside marriage brokage contracts, and separa-
tion agreements when the parties are living together.
(Fraud or oppression must probably have been used
by the other for one party to recover.)
1. Awarding restitution following a plea of incapacity by an infant.
2. Subrogating the payor to the paid-off creditor's rights; and
remedying the adoption of the benefit of unauthorized transac-
tions.
3. Handling claims under wills, intestacies, or inter vivos trusts.
4. Causing restitution of benefits acquired in breach of fiduciary re-
lationships.
In all these situations, say Messrs. Goff and Jones, the reason for
equity's intervention is to prevent unjust enrichment.16 In each case
equity makes available to the deprived plaintiff a personal, and some-
times also a proprietary, remedy. Now the question is, would it be
an advantage if the term "constructive trust" were used to mean (1)
that every such unjustly benefiting party is under an obligation to
the deprived, and (2) that equity compels him to discharge that
obligation by the payment of equivalent monetary value or, if pref-
erable, the restitution of the withheld sum, chattel, chose, or land?
A. Bringing Uniformity of Approach
It is certainly probable that such a comprehensive remedy would
tend, by stressing the theme of liability, to bring the existing remedies
and their treatment of the situations discussed into greater uniformity.
The Restatement of Restitution,7 for example, makes much of the
16. Id. at 3-5, 11-26. The present writer has omitted references to the remedies,
like rescission, rectification, and account, which inter alia prevent unconscionable
retention of gain.
17. REsTATEmENT, REsrrToN §§ 127, 165 (1937).
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liability of the unintended donee to restore to the intended donee
when the donor, subsequent to his act of donation and due to his
intervening death or incapacity, has been prevented from rectifying
the mistake. Messrs. Goff and Jones can only point to the merest
straws in the wind that English law will perfect such a gift.18 Yet
equity's remedies for fraud are fully developed. So here we have a
curious inconsistency. Is it not as unjust an enrichment for the person
having the deceased donor's property to withhold it from the intended
donee, as it is for the owner of property to acquire advantage by
letting another, who believes that the property is his own, work upon
it? This proximity of situations under the single head of "constructive
trust" would compel the courts to work out whether the principle
that equity will not perfect a gift should always prevail over the
principle that no one should be enriched at the expense of another.'0
Equity's yardstick, unconscionability, is a comprehensive term which,
unlike "unjust enrichment," does not suggest so starkly the choice
of policy which the court must make, and the balance it must strike.
B. Constructive Trustee of the Obligation to Perform
A further advantage of such an approach would be that the con-
structive trust would no longer be dominated by the express trust
notion that there must be specific property which the claimant seeks
to recover. And a question which at once comes to mind is this.
If there is unconscionability in the defendant's acquisition or
retention of property which was paid to him by the plaintiff in the
expectation that certain conduct would be forthcoming from the
defendant, can one usefully say that the defendant is a constructive
trustee of the benefit of that obligation which the plaintiff hopes to
derive?
Take the case of Harrison v. Gardner.20 Two partners had been
in business as cheesemongers for some seven years. One of them, the
defendant, was anxious to retire, and in the winding up of the
partnership, arbitrators settled the goodwill of the business at 1000
pounds. Five hundred pounds was accordingly paid to the defendant
by the remaining partner, the plaintiff, and there was mentioned at
the time of payment that it was assumed the defendant would not
thereafter compete in the vicinity of the business. No contract to
this effect was made, however, and the Vice Chancellor found the
authorities to be clear that sale of the goodwill did not automatically
18. GoFF & JoNES, RESTITUTION 423 (1966).
19. Professor Dawson points out that the notion of a volunteer merely means "that
in spite of clear enrichment we are helpless or unwilling to act." DAwsoN, UNJUST
ENICHMENT 128 (1951).
20. 2 Madd. 198, 56 Eng. Rep. 308 (V.C. 1817).
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impose a restraint upon the vendor. The defendant had simply
remained silent when non-competition was mentioned. Subsequently
he set up a similar business in the vicinity, and the plaintiff sued for
an injunction to restrain hi mfrom carrying on this business. The Vice
Chancellor decided for the plaintiff on the ground that the 500 pounds
had been paid to the defendant upon "the good faith and understand-
ing"2' that he would not compete. The payment of 500 pounds as-
sumed this. Then the judge said, "It is a bill for an injunction on
the ground of fraud, by receiving 500 [pounds] for not doing what
he afterwards does do; and resembles the case put in the argument,
of a testator intending to give a legacy, which the residuary legatee
says is unnecessary, as he will pay it."2' Both cases are decided by the
Vice Chancellor on the basis of fraud. "[It] is a relief sought in respect
of the fraud upon the intended legatee."23
In this case of the promising residuary legatee there is specific
property over which a constructive trust can be imposed. But, putting
the obligation of the defendant in the language of constructive trust,
it was beside the point to declare him a trustee of the 500 pounds.
The plaintiff, when he brought suit, was interested solely in prevent-
ing the defendant from setting up a competing business; it was the
benefit of that obligation which the plaintiff wanted. Nor was thd
obligation contractual, so that the plaintiff might have said that he
was entitled to specific performance, or to the 500 pounds on a total
failure of consideration. In any case, again, he was not interested in
the 500 pounds. What he wanted was an injunction, "and the court
held he was entitled to an injunction because of the defendant's
fraud. No one doubts that fraud is the obvious occasion upon Which a
constructive trust can come into operation. The only difficulty is
the nature of the "trust property." "If secret trusts are essentially
constructive trust obligations, as American courts and probably most
English writers think they are, then Harrison v. Gardner is authority
for the notion that the "trust property" can be the defendant's moral
obligation25 The more so would the defendant be a trustee of any
contractual obligation, which he had undertaken.
In Mocatta v. Bell,26 A returned securities to B, a broker, in ex-
21. Id. at 221, 56 Eng. Rep. at 316.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 222, 56 Eng. Rep. at 316.
24. GOFF & JONEs, RESTrrUTION (1966), except the secret trust from their study of
restitution.
25. Sheridan thinks Harrison v. Gardner decides that "where, for valuable considera-
tion, a person sells something and makes a promise (not amounting to a contract),
and where the value of the things sold depends substantially- on the vendor's keeping
his promise, he is bound in equity to keep his word." SHEmuDAN, FRAUD IN EQUITY
46 (1957).
26. 24 Beav. 585, 53 Eng. Rep. 483 (Rolls. 1857).
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change for B's cheque. B had insufficient funds to meet this cheque,
but was relying on C's promise that he would give B a cheque for
an equivalent sum. C, who owned the securities, recovered them
from B, but refused to hand over his cheque on the assertion that B
was attempting to defraud him. A sued C for the value of B's dis-
honoured cheque and interest, or for redelivery of the securities. Sir
John Romilly, Master of the Rolls,27 had no doubt that C's action in
not honouring his promise to B, when he had recovered the securities,
was fraudulent. And an account of C's liability was ordered.
There is no mention of constructive trust here, but was not C a
constructive trustee of the obligation to keep his promise? Would it
be an advantage to have a constructive trust remedy which extends
from a British Syphon Co. v. Homewood28 situation (abuse by a
fiduciary of the obligations of his office in order to make private gain)
29
to the specific performance of moral obligations? It is arguable.
C. Criticism
The great advantage of such a constructive trust is presumably that
the courts would concentrate on the equitable obligation of the
defendant rather than upon the appropriate character of the remedy
which is to be available to the plaintiff. Once an obligation has been
found, then is the time to start thinking what sort of order ought to be
made. And there is no need to tie the courts down in the making of
appropriate orders.
Clearly there is much to be said for the common sense of this
approach, but the mind boggles at the extraordinary assortment of
orders and situations calling for remedy which would be brought to-
gether under this head of constructive trust. And this may not
be purely the voice of conservatism. Several important questions
are raised by such a new bracket of constructive trusts. If constructive
trust were to be so broad as to cover all those equitable rules designed
to prevent or remedy gain by unconscionable conduct, would the term
really have much significance other than as a general synonym for
equitable relief? Can a remedy be too flexible? In the writer's view,
we in England are sufficiently far away from any general judicial
recognition of such a category of restitution liability that it is difficult
to see what the courts would make of the remedy. First reactions
might well be that such a device, a purported remedy, is shapeless and
27. "Master of the Rolls" will hereinafter be referred to as "M.R."
28. [1956] 1 Weekly L.R. 1190 (Ch.).
29. The employer sought an injunction against future disclosures of information,
an order for delivery up of the invention, documents, and all profits derived from the
invention, and an inquiry into the damages sustained by the claimant as a result of
the defendant's breach of contract.
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open-ended. After all, we would be doing something new in introduc-
ing the title "constructive trust" to a whole range of situations, some
already remedied in equity, and others not now so remedied or not
remedied at all. We may at the moment have isolated remedies and
examples in the law reports of remedial action. With express trust
rules in our minds, we may at present sometimes employ the term
"constructive trust." But at present we go no further.
One thing could certainly be said in its favour, and this supports
the point that it would bring uniformity of approach. We imagine the
relationship between the legal and equitable remedies in restitution
to be much clearer than in fact is the case. Whatever may be the posi-
tion in the United States, in England there is no clear distinction, and
to group so many equitable remedies and remedied situations under
the head of "constructive trusts" would compel us to rethink those
many areas where the two have an uneasy juxtaposition, administered
in the same high court, and never adequately rationalised though the
Judicature Acts are so many years away. Yet it seems futile to advo-
cate such a change just to jog our courts into thinking out the relation-
ship of law and equity in this field. In view, too, of the attitude of
most modem judges, who hold to the opinion that law reform is the
job of Parliament, it is the more difficult to see the value of this
change. In an era when we have a permanent Law Commission, it
seems best to do the job of rewriting the relation of legal and equit-
able restitution remedies in one fell swoop. Surely the time has come
for putting the jigsaw together. In view of the pressure upon judicial
time this is also a more realistic plan.
With a comprehensive constructive trust, divorced from proprietor-
ship and concerned with all equitable obligations to compel the mak-
ing good of unjust benefit, however, there are other problems which
call for a code of Restitution. The new constructive trust, assuming
that it comprehends all equitable relief against unjust enrichment,
would surely comprehend both personal and proprietary remedies.
And there are three questions which would be posed by such a
remedial trust: (1) Should the claimant recover relief of any kind
against the immediately benefited party? (2) Should the claimant
have priority over the general creditors of the insolvent benefited
party? and (3) Should the claimant be able to assert rights of property
over land, goods, or money in the third party's hands? It would seem
that without a statutory code of restitution we should be a very long
time indeed, and sacrifice many a litigant on the anvil of our inductive
method, before reaching a satisfactory separation and individual treat-
ment of these three questions. Assuming a code of restitution, how-
ever, we might well wish to make it a matter of judicial discretion, as
1966 ] 1225
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with the normal equitable relief, whether the claimant's equity pre-
vailed over general creditors. As for the third party we might wish
to adopt the solutions of the Restatement.
Indeed, the radical change which such a constructive trust involves
encourages one to be yet more radical. If we are to set in motion a
move of such a character, allowing the pursuit of equitable obligations
to carry us where it will, should we not also be concerned with the
unification of the remedies at law? Earlier, reference was made to the
relationship of law and equity; now we are concerned with the range
of common law relief. Again it is the writer's view that any develop-
ment on this scale should be thought out in its entirety, and not with-
in the jurisdictional strait jackets that law and equity have fashioned.
It is hard to find enthusiasm, ninety years after the Judicature Acts,
for the isolated development of another partially personal remedy,
this time in equity; a remedy which, proceeding independently along
lines of equity considerations, will often duplicate the action for
money had and received. Such a situation is foreshadowed by Read-
ing v. Attorney-General, to which we shall return.
The reporters of the Restatement of Restitution open their remarks
on the constructive trust with these words,31 "The term 'constructive
trust' is not altogether a felicitous one. It might be thought to suggest
the idea that it is a fiduciary relation similar to an express trust, where-
as it is in fact something quite different from an express trust." The
writer can appreciate the argument that judicial terminology is slow
in growth, and increasingly pregnant with meaning, and that on these
grounds we should be slow to jettison it. But one cannot help thinking
that if all unjust enrichment relief in equity is to be brought under
the title of constructive trust, why not abandon that term altogether.
It is too pregnant with meaning in English law. That is the trouble,
as Lord Westbury's words remind us.32 As long as we talk of con-
structive trust, we are always bound to ask, "What is the defendant
trustee of?" It is possible to reply, as the writer has said, that the
defendant is trustee of an obligation to put the deprived party into
the position where, but for the injustice, he would have been. In the
absence of codification, however, would there be sufficient compensa-
tion from an attempt to gain judicial recognition of such a trust remedy
as this? 'One would not hesitate for a moment in agreeing that ra-
tionalisation of the existing personal remedies in equity, account and
debt,33 is more than desirable, but whether or not the constructive
30. [1951] A.C. 507.
31. RESTATEMENT, REsTTrurToN § 160, comment a (1937).
32. McCormick v. Grogan, L.R. 4 H.L. 82, 97 (1869).
33. See part IV § B of this paper lnfra.
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trust is the medium for this advance is most questionable. We shall
return to this matter again.
IV. TAE CONSTRUCTivE TRUST AS A PROPRIETARY REMEDY:
A REACrON TO T=E RESTATEmENT
Another approach to the use of the term is to employ it as a means
of giving the claimant rights in specific property. This, of course, is
what the Restatement has in mind. Writing in the Law Quarterly
Review just after the publication of the Restatement, the reporters,
Professors Seavey and Austin Scott had this to say of their work:
The constructive trust is dealt with separately not because it is equitable in
nature, for that is true of the entire subject of restitution, and not because
it is enforceable in a Court of Equity, because the first part of the Restate-
ment deals with equitable rights as well as legal rights. It is dealt with
separately because it involves the idea of a proprietary right in particular
property rather than a merely personal right against an individual. This
part of the Restatement might perhaps more properly have been entitled
'Rights in Property Created as the Result of a Right to Restitution.' 4
The immediate reaction to such a proposal may well be that it pays
too much respect to the evident roots of the term constructive trust,
and that it very closely confines the horizons of the remedy. The al-
ternative, however, is to use the term to cover all unjust enrichment
in equity, and the desirability of this has already been reviewed. It
can also be said that the Restatement itself is not altogether happy
in its use of the term. Professor Scott 5 conceives of the term both
as a remedy for all those situations where title to property has been
acquired, the benefit of which ought (on grounds of unjust enrich-
ment) to be another's, and as a complementary device to the equit-
able lien. The constructive trust secures to the claimant the increased
value of the withheld property. But here, too, there is a good case
for the Restatement use of the term. The attraction of this second
usage is evident, having such an association as it does with the ability
of the express trust beneficiary to recover trust property and any
accretion thereto. And the writer, for his part, would advocate its
adoption in English law, even against the background of the law as it
is now. If the claimant wants a monetary judgment, and is not con-
cerned with priorities, he sues personally. If he wants to claim specif-
ic property, he asks for a constructive trust order. If he wants or can
only assert part interest in specific property, he asserts a lien over
that property, and must now argue his right to a first lien. The ad-
34. L.Q. REv. 29, 42 (1938).
35. 3 Sco-r, Thusvs §§ 462-63 (1939).
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vantage of the clarity of this scheme seems to the writer to outweigh
all other considerations.
What is more important, however, is that in its conception of the
constructive trust the Restatement assumes two things of considerable
significance. First, that law and equity are so related that the con-
structive trust can simply complement the remedies at law by being
available when the legal remedies are inadequate.36 Secondly, that
if a right to or over specific property is available, it also involves, in
respect of that property, a right to priority over the general creditors,
a priority which can only be avoided by one of the defenses outlined.
A. Complementing the Remedies at Law
Let us take the first assumption. It is difficult to say how a pro-
prietary constructive trust would complement the personal actions at
law and in equity, because there is so little authority in English law.
What little there is concerns itself solely with the breach of fiduciary
relationships. One problem in saying that proprietary remedies shall
be available only when personal remedies are inadequate is that
personal actions may not be available when unjust enrichment has
occurred. Should the claimant have a right in specific property when
he has no personal action? Should a real right be permitted to arise
to supply the lack of a personal right?
I sell you my car, which I know to have an irritating engine fault.
The fault is spasmodic, and gives particular trouble in low winter
temperatures. The sale takes place in summer, and the fault is then
much more difficult to discover on inspection. The car looks well,
and the engine sounds well. You buy at a price which reflects those
qualities. I make no representations or warranties, but I know that
that car is going to run you into considerable expense when the winter
comes. Indeed, that is the main reason I am selling the car. As
Lord Atkin reminds us,37 there is no recovery for money had and
received in these circumstances. Indeed, there is no remedy at law;
but does this necessarily bar recovery of your money by a proprietary
lien remedy? I may even concede that the down payment on a new
car, which I have just acquired, was the same sum which you paid
me. Should you not in justice have a lien on my new car for the
monetary difference between the true value of the vehicle you bought
from me, and the price you paid? And, if you can show that I de-
posited the sale money in a bank savings account which has since
earned interest or any similar accretion, should you have no remedy
at all against me? It is arguable against such a lien, of course, that
36. For introductory remarks, see RSTATEmENT, RES=TTo N § 160, comment e
(1937).
37. Supra note 6.
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you should have protected yourself by securing warranties from me,
and that you have only yourself to blame for the expense of repairs.
But the fact is that you did not, and that I was wise enough to keep
myself on the right side of actionable fraud. There is much to be
said both for the justice and the injustice of letting this loss lie where
it falls. On the one hand, it is possible to say that this is not a restitu-
tion situation since here is a deliberate lacuna in the law of contract.
The parties have satisfied the requirements in order to bring a contract
into existence, and thereafter their remedies and the scope of those
remedies are governed by contract law. On the other hand there is
much appeal in the contention that before English law has explained
satisfactorily why some unjust enrichment situations are not rectified
and has worked out a logical and defensible set of rules on when
conversion, detinue and the indebitatus accounts can be brought,38
the constructive trust should not be restricted to those situations where
there is an action at law, but the defendant is insolvent.
B. Constructive Trust as a Right To Trace; and Subrogation
Second, should the constructive trust carry an automatic right to
trace into the assets of the insolvent withholder, a right lost only if
one of the restitutionary defenses is available? Should the duty to
account be a distinct issue from the right of the claimant to trace?
The question has been put in this way:
Even in the case of an express trust, such as Williams v. Barton [1927] 2 Ch.
9, it is difficult to see why, supposing the defendant to have become bank-
rupt, the plaintiff should have priority over the defendant's general creditors
in respect of the sum earned on commission. What is the principle that
prefers that plaintiff to the plaintiff in Brook's Wharf v. Goodman [1937] 1
K.B. 534? Such a question poses large issues. .... 39
In Williams v. Bartone4  a trustee was employed as a clerk in a firm
of stockbrokers, and was paid on a commission basis. The trustee
secured for his firm the valuation of trust securities, and was accord-
ingly paid by the firm half the fees which it had charged the trust.
The trustee had no part in the valuation, nor in the size of the fees,
yet in an action for breach of trust the trustee was held liable to restore
completely the half fees he had been paid by the firm. Russell J.
had little difficulty in finding that the trustee, being subject to the
conflict of interest and duty rule, had increased his remuneration by
virtue of his trusteeship. "In my opinion this increase of remuneration
38. The writer has made some comment on this problem. Waters, Restitution, The
Need for Reform, 17 Cumtinr LEGAL PROBLEMS 42 (1964).
39. Davies, supra note 3, at 595-96.
40. [1927] 2 Ch. 9.
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is a profit made by the defendant out of and by reason of his trustee-
ship, which he would not have made but for his position as trustee."4'
The problem in Brook's Wharf & Bull Whirt, Ltd. v. Goodman Bros.,42
however, did not involve the conflict of interest and duty rule.
The defendants had consigned goods under contract of bailment to
bonded warehousemen, the plaintiffs. The goods were imported by
the defendants from Russia, and while in the warehouse were stolen.
The Crown exercised its statutory right to claim customs duties on
these goods, and under the statute the plaintiffs were obligated to pay.
The plaintiffs were refused reimbursement by the defendants, and
brought an action to recover the sum they had been compelled to
pay. They succeeded before Bronson J. and his judgment was
upheld in the Court of Appeal. In effect A had had to pay B's debt
owed to C, and A sought to recover from B the benefit which B had
gained in the discharge of his debt. "The case is analogous," said
Lord Wright, "to that of a payment by a surety which has the effect
of discharging the principal's debt and which, therefore, gives a right
of indemnity against the principal."43 The plaintiffs' liability to the
Crown was analogous to that of a surety.
In the Williams case, the trust recovered the commission because
of the rule in Keech v. Sanford,4 that a trustee shall not allow his in-
terest to conflict with his duty. This rule is applied strictly because the
courts have only the trustee's word as to the real intention behind his
acts, and the value of the trust as a working concept hinges upon the
disinterested business efficiency of the trustee as the person with sole
powers of management and disposition. And in the Brook's Wharf
case, though to date English law has not developed the doctrine of
subrogation so extensively as have American jurisdictions, it is pos-
sible in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy that the courts would
subrogate the claimant to the rights of the Crown against the insolvent
debtor.45 The answer to Mr. Davies' question, then, is that the whole
basis of the trust concept requires that the trustee be effectively de-
terred from putting his interest ahead of his duty. The obligation to
41. Id. at 12.
42. [1937] 1 K.B. 534 (1936).
43. Id. at 544.
44. Cas. t. King 61, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 741 (1726).
45. The possibility is, however, a slim one. Subrogation in English law is only
applied in certain situations. See GoFF & JoNns, RPsn-run-oN 375-92 (1966); 14
HALSBURy, LAws OF ENcLAND 618-19 (3d ed. 1956). Suretyship is one of these,
and in Brook's Wharf, as we have said, Lord Wright several times analogises the
statutory liability of the plaintiff' to pay the customs duties to suretyship. On the
other hand the preferential right of the Crown to tax or duty payments stems from
consideration of public policy which would not necessarily apply to any private citizen
who seeks subrogation to the Crown's right.
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turn over to the trust any advantage that could have resulted from
the pursuit of interest, compels utter loyalty to the trust. The plaintiff
warehousemen in the Brook's Wharf case were not express trust bene-
ficiaries. And, if this loyalty principle is not satisfactory, then we re-
turn to that same basic question of whether restitution remedies, and
the problem of what is a sufficiently unjust enrichment to merit
remedy, should invade the law of trusts and other distinct fields of
obligation.
But Mr. Davies' question becomes more forceful, one would suggest,
if it is assumed that Barton was not a trustee, but an agent of the
claimant. Let us again assume that Barton, the agent, is insolvent
when the claim for the commission is made by his principal. In these
circumstances the principal will, be able to trace the commission
moneys until they are no longer ascertainable among the insolvent
agent's assets, and in this way the principal will be in the position of a
secured creditor. The body of unsecured creditors will accordingly
take less on the dollar than they would have had the commission
moneys not been ascertainable. On the other hand, in the event of
Goodman Brothers' insolvency the claimants in the Brook's Wharf
case would have found themselves merely subrogated to the paid-off
creditor,46 and their chances of recovery in full would have depended
quite fortuitously on the type of creditor in whose rights they found
themselves subrogated. Subrogation to the secured creditor is the most
fortunate outcome for the claimant, assuming that the security has not
been disposed of before the payor of the debt claims subrogation
rights. And subrogation to the preferred creditor holds more promise
for the claimant than subrogation to the general creditor. But it is
the general creditor who is most likely to have pressed the debtor for
payment, and if the debtor has already achieved payment or acquired
the claimant's money for this purpose, in either case by wrongful
action, the claimant will consequently find himself more often with
only the rights of the general creditor.
This makes the Restatement look arbitrary, for the constructive
trustee with his right to trace is really a most fortunate man. Is this a
satisfactory result? Should priority over the general creditors of the
insolvent recipient of gain turn upon the accident of the mode of -de-
privation inflicted upon the claimant? Should it turn, that is to say,.
upon whether property over which the claimant can assert proprietary
rights has come into the hands of the wrongdoer. or his transferee, so.
that the constructive trust remedy becomes available to the claimant?-
Second, should'the unfortunate claimant, whose resources paid off an
innocent third party, find that his ranking among the creditors de-
46. If they had a right of subrogation.
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pends upon the chance of which creditor was paid off with the
claimant's money?
1. The Unjust Enrichment View. 47-There are two possible lines
of argument on this point. The first stresses the fact that remedies
are applied because unjust enrichment has occurred. And if there has
been unjust enrichment, there is no reason why one wronged claimant
should be in any better position in relation to general creditors than
other claimants. Why should the claimant who can ascertain his prop-
erty among the wrongdoer's assets, or possibly the third party's, have
that security while another claimant with an equally strong equity
to restitution finds himself taking his luck among the body of creditors?
It is sometimes argued that the reason for giving priority over the
creditors to the claimant who can still ascertain the property, to which
he makes claim, is that he did not take any commercial risk in leaving
property in the wrongdoer's hands or in advancing loans or credit to
him. The man whose property was taken, or even whose office held
by the wrongdoer was abused for gain, took no risk. The general credi-
tors did. From this point of view it is logical that the creditors should
not expect that any property, which finds its way by mistake of the
transferor, the fraud or duress of the bankrupt into the bankrupt's
hands, should increase the fund available for distribution among
the creditors.
But, the unjust enrichment argument proceeds, should this rea-
soning apply only to the claimant who is fortunate enough to be
able to point to the property which he claims? If the claimant's
moneys have been used to pay off one general creditor, then the
bankrupt's assets are increased by that sum, because that standing
sum of assets is now to be distributed among the creditors, less one.
Should not the claimant now be entitled to a charge or lien over the
assets available for distribution among the unsecured creditors? This
would recognise that the inequity of the claimant's deprivation puts
him ahead of the general creditors who deliberately took the risk of
the wrongdoer's continued solvency. In other words, it is no justifica-
tion of the superior restitution rights of the man who can identify
his property that he, unlike the creditors, took no commercial risk.
Nor did the claimant, whose only rights lie in subrogation, take
such a risk.,
I English law, as we have said, has a less developed use of sub-
rogation, and this means that the claimant in Brook's Wharf, faced
47. Perhaps it wodld have been more exact to call this the "unjust deprivation"
view,;for ffhat is really the point. The wrongdoer has deprived the claimant of his
property. 
- 48. The-unjust enrichment view has clear points of contact with the "swollen assets"
theory, familiar in the United States.
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with the insolvency of the wrongdoer, may be in an even worse posi-
tion than his counterpart in the United States.
2. The Benefit-Acquired View.-The alternative line of argument
is that claims based on unjust enrichment assume that a benefit has
been acquired. The correct question is, who has benefited or stands
to benefit by reason of the deprivation of the claimant. It is that
benefit which must be prevented from unjustly enriching another.
If property has passed from the claimant to the wrongdoer, or specific
property in the wrongdoer's possession is earmarked as the produce of
conduct abusive of office, then it is right that the claimant should
have rights of property over that asset or obvious benefit, whatever
form it may take. The creditors of the wrongdoer cannot possibly
assert that the ascertained property should go to swell the general
assets of the bankrupt. The creditors of the insolvent transferee who
knows of the transferor's wrongdoing are in no better position. In
other words, the equity of the claimant is so obvious that if ascertain-
able property which is the product of the wrongful act exists, the
claimant should have it. So much for the proprietary remedies of
constructive trust and equitable lien.
What of the claimant in a Brook's Wharf situation where the wrong-
doer is insolvent? Here it would be stressed that the general creditors
gain nothing if the claimant is subrogated to the rights of the paid-
off creditor. There were x creditors claiming the general assets;
there remain x creditors, though one creditor has given his place to
the claimant.49 It is arguable, though, that if there is evidence that the
wrongdoer would in any event have satisfied the now paid-off creditor
out of his remaining funds, had the claimant's money not been avail-
able, then the claimant's money has in effect increased the bankrupt
debtor's assets by preventing depletion. And, it seems, this argument
has succeeded in the United States.50 But the weight of American
authority appears to be against it.5 1
The real difficulty, of course, is that the paid-off creditor is the one
who has benefited and he will almost always be a bona fide purchaser
for value, so that no claim can be brought against him. There is no
overcoming this difficulty. In the outcome most courts in the United
States seem to feel that subrogation is the answer to the Brook's Wharf
insolvency problem. In England, too, it could be said by way of justifi-
cation of a subrogation result that the existence of the nation-wide
49. Nor, of course, does the bankrupt acquire any benefit. He still faces x creditors.
50. Jones v. Chesebrough, 105 Iowa 303, 75 N.W. 97 (1898).
51. 3 ScoTT, TusTs § 521.2 (1939). Scott appears to be the leading proponent of
the benefit acquired view, though the writer must confess that he is not convinced by
Scott's forceful advocacy. See DAwsoN, UNjsT ENracmmwarr 31-32 (1951); Taft,
A Defense of a Limited Use of the Swollen Assets Theory Where Money Has Wrong-
fully Been Mingled With Other Money, 39 CoLum. L. .Rav. 172, 174-75 (1939)
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banks does away with so many familiar American problems arising
out of the failure of private local banks, and that it is the secret lien
that general creditors are concerned about rather than the claimant
in unjust enrichment, who would in any case be a rarer phenomenon.
But of course these facts can also be used to bolster the unjust enrich-
ment view. If there is no considerable volume of such cases of unjust
enrichment, at least the Jones v. Chesebrough52 decision should pre-
vail, giving priority to the claimant when there is evidence that the
wrongdoer would have paid the pressing creditor out of his own
assets. The benefit-acquired view, however, would still regard sub-
rogation as sufficient remedy.
3. Criticism of These Two Views.-To the writer there seems a
nice balance between these arguments. There is much force in the
suggestion that, if there is to be a proprietary constructive trust,
subrogation should give way to a right to an equitable lien over the
assets of the insolvent, thus giving priority to the unfortunate who
has paid another's debt.53 On the other hand there is equal force in
the fact that a bona fide purchaser halts all proprietary claims since
he prevents the Brook's Wharf claimant (assuming insolvency) from
ever having a proprietary remedy. The claimant can only take over
the personal claim of the unsecured creditor. The paid-off unsecured
creditor is a bona fide purchaser for value.-9
In these circumstances, it seems to the writer unsatisfactory to
deny any proprietary remedy (constructive trust or lien) because
some acts of deprivation immediately result in the benefiting of a
bona fide purchaser for value. To deny the remedy would seem al-
most churlish. It seems to be saying that if we cannot give. a. right to
specific property in all cases, we will give it in none. This may be
carrying "equity" to the point where it practically defeats itself. The
right to trace might be at the discretion of the court, as we have
previously said, but this must essentially mean that the claimant's
right to label the defendant a constructive trustee is to be at the
discretion of the court. Courts in the United States appear to have
avoided this result by developing further than we have done the
bars to the constructive trust, in particular, the defenses of change of
52. Supra note 50.
53. In the writer's view Taft, supra note 51, puts up a very persuasive case on the
merits of a limited "swollen assets" theory. Particularly interesting is the view that as
the equitable lien, unlike the constructive trust, is not necessarily tied to the situation
where the property taken can be identified, there is no reason why it should not be
imposed on equitable considerations over the general unencumbered property of the
wrongdoer. Id. at 186-89.
54. Though Taft, supra note 51; thinks the "swollen assets" theory can be of value
where the misuse of the claimant's moneys took place during the solvency of the
wrongdoer. At that time uncommitted moneys' of the wrongdoer could have been used
to pay off the pressing creditor.
[ VOL. 19
ENGLISH CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
position and the meaning of purchaser for value. In the outcome
the writer is persuaded that the American courts are right. Certainly
it is difficult to see how a constructive trust can give a right to
specific property and deny the right to trace. If it is justifiable for
the claimant to recover earmarked property in the solvent defendant's
hands, why may it no longer be justifiable when all the assets in
the defendant's hands are insufficient to meet the general creditors?15
The general creditors may well have a better argument to resist the
claimant's tracing when the constructive trust extends beyond the
fiduciary relationship to the remedying of all types of unjust en-
richment. But the general creditors in England. could not at present
put up this argument. The possibly limited value of the subrogation
right is not in itself persuasive that there ought to be a distinction
within the constructive trust of the duty to account, and the right
to trace. Rather than take away a right to trace, it would be prefer-
able to have a well-developed set of defenses to an assertion of this
right, or even a priority over general creditors instead of subrogation.
56
As a postscript to this criticism of the two views, it must be said
that in England it is odd that money had and received, and money
paid, are such complementary remedies at law, while the real rights,
so important when the benefited party is bankrupt, may well be
nonexistent. With us the constructive trust needs the existence of
a fiduciary relationship, and subrogation may not be available, ap-
plying as it presently does to only a narrow set of circumstances.
This is our present problem. We are still far back on the unjust
enrichment trail.
4. The English Position on Subrogation.-In England there is some
precedent apparently giving such priority over general creditors,
but it is merely a priority within--the principle of subrogation. It
is fundamental that in insurance law the insurer is "entitled to the
advantage of every right of the assured, whether'such right consists
in contract, fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of
being insisted on or already insisted on, or in any, other right, whether
by way of condition or otherwise, legal or equitable, which can be,
or has been exercised or has accrued. . . ."57 This means' that, if the
assured has a contractual right to a sum of' money, is in- receipt of
55. The property does not cease to be identifiable when general creditors enter upon
the scene.
56. The formular character of the doctrine of tracing probably pleases few people
in its attempt to hold the balance between claimants against wrongdoing and general
creditors. It involves a heavy- burden of proof, on the claimant, and its fictions and
presumptions, as Taft says, leave little room for admiration. But at least it is a bulwark
against unpredictable judicial discretion, and on that score is in principle defensible.
57. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 388 (1883).
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indemnification from the insurer because of non-receipt, and subse-
quently receives a sum of money from the contractually obligated
payor, the insurer is so subrogated to the rights of the assured that
he can claim that specific sum ahead of the assured's general
creditors.
In In re Miller, Gibb & Co., though the court found that there
had been a legal assignment from the assured to the insurer of the
rights to the sum due, and that this had taken place prior to the
assured's liquidation, Wynn-Parry J. made it clear that the effect
of the insurer's subrogation to the contractual rights of the assured
would be that, should any sum be subsequently paid to the assured
after indemnification, the assured would be a trustee of that sum for
the insurer. And in In re Johnson,59 Jessel, M.R., pointed out another
case where subrogation would give creditors of the bankrupt a right
to specific property. An executor/trustee has powers to carry on a
trader's business, and the settlor/trader directs that a specific portion
of his estate shall be available for this purpose. The trustee carries
on the business, becomes personally bankrupt, and it is then found that
he owes moneys to the trust estate, and other moneys to creditors of
the business.60 The effect of the creditors' stepping into the trustee's
shoes, said Jessel, M.R., was that they took both the disadvantages
and advantages of his position. Repair of breaches of trust would
be a first charge on the trustee's assets, but the business creditors
would be entitled thereafter to be subrogated to the trustee's rights
of indemnification out of the specific portion of the estate designated
for running the business. It follows that, had there been no breaches
of trust, and the portion of the estate set aside to be used for trading
had alone not deteriorated in value, the creditors would yet have been
able to idemnify themselves, ahead of all others, out of that trading
fund.
In both these situations, however, the right is essentially of sub-
rogation. Neither in the insurance case nor the trust estate case
could the insurer or creditor do other than enforce in his favour
the rights to which he was subrogated. These cases are no authority
for a priority over the general creditors; they are merely examples
of claims to specific assets arising out of subrogation to contractual
rights. In re Johnson is a good example. The trustee went bankrupt
owing to the estate moneys for which he had not accounted, and
owing to creditors of the business which he had carried on, the pay-
ment of their bills. The estate beneficiaries took priority. The tech-
nical explanation is that the creditors of the business stood in the
58. [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 703, 710, [1957] 2 All E.R. 266, 271 (Ch.).
59. 15 Ch. D. 548 (1880).
60. The trustee becomes indebted to the business creditors in his own name.
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bankrupt's shoes, and the bankrupts right to indemnification out
of the trust fund assigned for trading could only exist if he himself
were not otherwise in debt to the estate for breaches of trust. But
this merely conceals the real question. Why did the trust beneficiaries
prevail over the business creditors? Because the personal claim of
the trust beneficiaries over the bankrupt trustee's assets was a remedy
superior to the mere subrogation of the creditors to the trustee's
rights of indemnification out of the trust fund, even though part of
the trust assets were set aside for trading. Indeed, once Jessel, M.R.,
had determined that the creditors' right was merely one of subroga-
tion, the case was at an end. The breaches of trust were not then
questioned as giving other than a first claim to the beneficiaries. 61
For this reason, it is hard to accept Jessel, M.R.'s comment that the
creditors' right to be indemnified out of the assets devoted to trading,
"is a mere corollary to those numerous cases in Equity in which
persons are allowed to follow trust funds." It is a proprietary right in
the sense that it is a right to attach specific property, but it is also
personal insofar as it must give way to a superior and fully proprietary
right.62
V. TBE VALuEs OF A PROPRIETARY REMEDY
Looking at the Restatement and the whole question of a proprietary
constructive trust remedy from the position of an English lawyer, we
are brought back to the two dominant questions. First, should the
new constructive trust in English law, like the Restatement trust, be
proprietary in character, that is, concerned only with specific restitu-
tion? Second, assuming that it should be proprietary, should the
right to specifii restitution survive the insolvency of the benefited
party?
A. "Proprietary" Remedies at Law and in Equity
On the first point, it has already been argued that a general remedy
under the name of constructive trust, permitting the courts to award
either specific restitution or a money judgment, is undesirable. What
we should be concerned with today in England is the substance
and merits of restitution, not so much with the scope of remedies
and the niceties of pleading. We want a medium for the clear judicial
61. Had the executor/trustee used his office to win a commission from a third party,
and mixed that sum with the fund set aside to meet business expenses, the trust
beneficiaries could also have followed with priority into that mixed fund.
62. As-this paper has-argued, subrogation merely constitutes a compulsory assignment-
of the creditor's contractual rights to the claimant. There is no right to specific property
of the bankrupt. On this question of subrogation, see GOFF & JONEs, REsTrrutroN
40, f" (e) (1966).
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question, what does the claimant want? We do not want the age
old query, has he brought the right action? In the writer's view, we
will get the right question if our remedies exactly frame what the
claimant wants. Broad remedies in equity tend to be a medium for
judicial freedom in making orders, not for the clarity of the law.
Again, a proprietary trust faces the court with a clear choice-mone-
tary judgment or an order giving an exclusive right to specific prop-
erty. Different considerations go to each. Then, third, much needs
to be done in building up our proprietary remedies in English law.
They just do not exist in many fields, causing an immediate void.6
3
Is not this the obvious role for the constructive trust-to raise the
question how and when there ought to be a right to specific property
rather than for equity to duplicate personal remedies?
One of the main arguments for the proprietary constructive trust,
however, seems to be rooted in the nature of quasi-contractual claims
at law. It is well established that the reason for the action for money
had and received being a personal action is that property in the
money has passed from the claimant, or was never in the claimant,
so that he is compelled to seek an equivalent sum. However, this
formulation conceals the true nature of the right the claimant seeks to
enforce, which is not compensation or damages, but the restitution of
that sum to which he was entitled. It has recently been said, as the
basis of a theory of quasi-contracts, that "whereas the right to money
is proprietary, the action by which we enforce it is 'personal.' " And
there are judicial dicta of weight in English law to support this an-
alysis.65 Indeed, the old common lawyers thought that the action
for money had and received was logically a remedy for the following
of moneys into the defendant's assets. It was not the principle of
following that pulled the remedy up short; it was the technical
arguments about mixed funds. To the writer's mind this means that,
since a theme of property recovery allies both the largest area of
quasi-contractual remedy and the equitable remedies of constructive
trust, lien, and account, there is the stronger case for not deliberately
creating at this stage a pattern of overlapping remedies.
Are the considerations, which would encourage equity to award
a monetary judgment to the claimant, so different from those which
would exist at law that in 1966 we need a remedy which obviously
overlaps the field of the money had and received action? It is true
that the criteria of equity have always been broad, moralistic, and
vague enough to make the equitable remedies more sensitive to
such situations as unjust enrichment, and more discretionary in ap-
- 63. See id. at 40 n.39.
64. STOLjAR, QUASI-CONTRACT 7 (1964).
65. Id. at 6-7.
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plication. But then, as Dr. Stoljar has recently shown in considering
the "following" aspects of the legal remedy, the money had and
received action was unnecessarily stunted by uncomprehending courts.
Its potential remains enormous.66 It would be a happier solution if
the legal remedy dealt with personal money claims, and constructive
trust were to find its natural function in handling specific restitution
claims. At the moment the constructive trust fiduciary action and
the action for money had and received overlap. What remains for
equity to do by way of monetary judgments, and ideally this would
be very much a residual remedy, could be done by a broadened
action of account. In the last analysis, if new situations of unjust
enrichment are to be remedied, it would be much better if they were
considered within the context of the law of restitution as a whole,
rather than in terms of whether a remedy can be found or be pressed
into service.
Where the claimant seeks recovery of land or chattels which he
asserts are unjustly withheld to thesolvent defendant's benefit, but
title to which has previously passed to the defendant from the plain-
tiff or was never in the plaintiff, then one can see no objection to
the constructive trust complementing in this way, too, the inadequacy
of the legal remedies. 67 The accent of constructive trust invocation
is again complementing of existing remedies. Supposedly, it could
again at this point be asked, if we are to go as far as this with our
constructive trust, why impose any limitations on this equitable
remedy. Let it apply in any circumstances, whatever the subject mat-
ter sought, if the plaintiff feels the doctrines of equity are a better
medium for the arguments which he wishes to present. Why should
the plaintiff be told that the remedy at law is adequate for his pur-
poses, so that he must make his way on a moot point. through the old
common law cases rather than take advantage of the no doubt crisper
and cleaner lines of an equitable remedy? The answer to such an
objection seems to spring from the demise of the old Court of Chan-
cery. Our pattern of remedies should reflect a pattern of consistent
thought on when there ought to be restitution, how far it should extend
and what form it ought to take. It is more than improbable, one would
concede, that the single jurisdiction in England and Wales is going
to produce such a proliferation of remedies as exist in the United
States, but this seems an insufficient reason for etting Equity in
England have its head, so to speak, in 1966. Its role should be to
supplement the law in a new and orderly fashion6
66. Id. at 99. See also GOFF & JONES, REsTITUToN 36 n.12 (1966).
67. Cf. GOFF & JONES, RESTrnTTON 20 (1966). Bannister v. Bannister, [1948] 2
All E.R. 133 (C.A.), is exactly on these lines.
68. A critic of this might say that the constructive trust ought to be sufficiently
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Another thing which gives one confidence in this argument is
that, though the reason for the quasi-contractual remedies being
personal is largely the product of history and of the forms of action
employed to gain recovery, times are changing. Today in England
there is widespread recognition that there was little, if any, justifica-
tion for the judicial castigation Lord Mansfield received in English
courts during the early twentieth century for his view that the
basis of the indebitatus claims lay in equitable principles.69 Since
there is this recognition, and a good argument that the action for
money had and received may still be available against third parties,.0
we come yet closer to the interrelationship of all "proprietary" reme-
dies at law and equity.
But if the constructive trust is to have shape and an obvious and
exclusive place in the pattern of remedies, rather than act as a general
catch-all for situations where for one reason or another other remedies
are not open to the claimant,71 we have both to be watchful of mis-
leading trends, and ready to analyse the equitable rights of which
we speak. Indeed, the present need of this analysis seems only likely
to be satisfied if we disassociate the right to monetary restitution
from the right to specific property. Let us look at one misleading
trend, and at one situation where analysis is needed.
1. Avoidance of False Hares.-At present in English law the con-
structive trust is a post facto rationalisation. If a man is a fiduciary,
then he may not, without informed consent, employ his office or
his beneficiary's property in any way so as to secure personal ma-
terial advantage. Any proprietary advantage which he makes must
be disgorged. Some courts, having applied this rule, will then de-
scribe the fiduciary as a constructive trustee or simply as a trustee.
Others will not bother to echo this incantation. Either technique
merely describes the results of the relief; the inspiration for the lia-
bility comes from the express trust rules. Indeed, the obvious area
in which the phrase "constructive trust" or "made a trustee" is likely
to be used is in connection with express trust actions, where, ironic-
ally enough, it is hard to discover clear unjust enrichment preven-
tion thinking at all.
flexible in character to come to the relief of the law, as Lord Cairns' principle in
Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry., 2 App. Cas. 439 (1877), came to the relief of the law
in the guise of equitable estoppel. To the writer's mind, however, the substance of
the law of restitution is still too little settled for a real parallel with the law of
contract to be drawn.
69. The latest example is GoFF & JoNEs, REsTTUTIoN 3-14 (1966).
70. See authorities cited in note 66 supra.
71. Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914] A.C. 398 (no contract could be implied at law and
the equitable remedy was therefore pressed into service).
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Suppose an agent to the trustee acts in such a way that he de-
liberately puts his own personal interests ahead of the trust affairs
which he is conducting. He may act fraudulently, in which case
he would obviously be accountable, or he may simply have so involved
his personal interests in the matter in which he is concerned as an
agent (to use Lord Langdale's words),72 that he is held accountable.
He may have acted in collusion with a trustee who was himself act-
ing in breach of trust, or he may be acting alone. In each case (again
to borrow Lord Langdale's words), the question is whether the act
of the agent has been such that the court "ought to impute to [the
agent] . . . the character of a trustee."73 But, as Lord Selbourne
put it,
strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act
as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transac-
tions, perhaps, of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those
agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property,
or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design
on the part of the trustees.74
Lord Langdale's language is more exact in defining the types of con-
duct which will result in the liability to account, but we are not
concerned with this matter. Rather, we are concerned with the order
making the agent a trustee. The cases are confused in the use of the
terms constructive trustee and trustee de son tort, because whichever
one is used is of no real importance. The effect of the order is not
necessarily to make the agent disgorge personal gain, but usually to
make the agent subject to the express trustee's liability, a personal
liability arising out of breach. The obligation may be to repair loss
which the trust has suffered or restore gain made by employment of
the agency office. But, essentially, the agent is made subject to the
breach of trust action, which holds the express trustee personally liable
and, in the event of the trustee's insolvency, allows tracing of ascertain-
able property in which, through the breach, the trust has an equit-
able proprietary interest.
This means that the agent will have to make good out of his own
pocket any trust property which was lost through his essentially self-
seeking act, as in Alleyne v. Darcy.75 It is irrelevant that the agent
never made any personal gain out of his act, and equally irrelevant
even that he never had control of the trust property.7 6 It is his act
72. Fyler v. Fyler, 3 Beav. 550, 561, 49 Eng. Rep. 216, 221 (Rolls. 1841).
73. Ibid.
74. Barnes v. Addy, L.R. 9 Ch. 244, 251-52 (1874).
75. 4 Ir. Ch. R. 199 (1854).
76. Participating in an express trustee's fraudulent scheme would be enough.
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which makes him subject to the breach of trust action. Kekewich J.
in In re Barney1" however, was uncertain how an agent could be
any kind of trustee when he has never had control of trust prop-
erty. His judgment, therefore, equates the constructive trustee and
the trustee de son tort, and, because there has been no subsequent
quarrel with this, his judgment also makes it perfectly clear that
it does not matter what you call the agent who is subject to the
breach of trust action. The decisions do not seem too concerned
whether the man "made a trustee" is constructive, de son tort, or
simply a trustee, and whether or not that man had control of trust
property, so long as the conditions for his subjection to the breach
of trust action are clearly understood.78
It is clear there has to be a remedy in this kind of case. Few would
dispute this, and subjection to the remedy for breach of trust makes
perfectly good sense. But would it not be better to have the de-
scription of the process as "making the stranger a trustee," or even
as trusteeship de son tort, and leave it at that? There is no remedial
constructive trust here. The writer can find no enthusiasm for in-
cluding Lord Selbourne's constructive trustee within the situations
that are suitable jumping-off points in the formulation of an inde-
pendent remedial constructive trust. Dare one suggest that to follow
Lord Selbourne's constructive trust thinking is to be more imbued
with express trust analogy than to employ "constructive trust" as
the title for a specific restitution action?
2. Analysis of Equitable Rights.-The need for clarification of what
we mean by equitable rights, and for a distinct allocation of equit-
able remedies to a place in the framework of restitution remedies,
is well brought out by the discussion in English courts over the
recovery by the principal from the agent of bribes or commissions
which the agent has received from third parties. The entitlement of
the principal (P) to any moneys or property which the agent (A)
gains through abuse of his office is debated by no one. The discussion
is on a purely procedural point. What remedies are available to P,
and what do the remedies secure to him? It is important to remem-
ber this.
It is well known that in Lister & Co. v. Stubbse9 the Court of Appeal
held, following Metropolitan Bank v. Heiron,0 that, since P did not
have title to the commission, he could not gain an injunction against
77. [1892] 2 Ch. 265.
78. MARSHALL, NATHAN'S EQUITY THROUG THE CAsiEs 470 (4th ed. 1961), sug-
gests a possible reconciliation of the cases.
79. 45 Ch. D. 1 (1890).
80. L.R. 5 Ex. D. 319 (1880). Here the question was whether the Statute of
Limitations ran against the principal who claimed a secret commission received by his
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A to prevent A from disposing of either the investments or the pro-
ceeds of the commission, nor could he gain an order requiring other
investments to be brought into court. The relationship between P
and A, said Lord Justice Lindley, was that of creditor and debtor, not
trustee and cestui que trust. There was no doubt that A had to pay
over and account for the money he had received, but to call him a
trustee of those moneys would be unsound, "the unsoundness consist-
ing in confounding ownership with obligation."81 The duty of the
fiduciary to hold in trust could only arise when moneys, or other
property belonging to P, came into A's hands. In the court below,
Stirling f. was prepared to say82 that P might sue A in an action
for money had and received, but since the money had never belonged
to P, P could not invoke Taylor v. Plumer83 and follow the money into
the investments. Putting it in the language of equity, and adopting
Lord Justice Cotton's words in Metropolitan Bank, Stirling J. said
this was "a suit founded on breach of duty or fraud by a person
who was in the position of trustee, his position making the receipt
of the money a breach of duty or fraud. . . . [But] the whole title
[of P] depends on its being established by a decree of a competent
court that the fraud of the trustee has given the cestui que trust a
right to the money."84
The Court of Appeal agreed, Lord Justice Bowen concurring.n
In Metropolitan Bank, however, Lord Justice James had described
the offence of A as "concealed fraud." The fiduciary, who received
a bribe for misconduct, had to give it up. "But it must be borne in
agent. The court held that, since the commission had never belonged to the principal,
he was not in an analogous position to the beneficiary of an express trust. Therefore
the statutory period did run from the discovery by the principal of the agent's
receipt. The writer has elsewhere discussed how different is this constructive trust
problem of the limitation statutes from the nature and operation of the remedial
constructive trust. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: THE CASE FOR A NEv
APPROAcH iN ENGLISH LAw 292-321 (1964). In Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, supra note
79, the principal was seeking an injunction and an order against the agent, presumably
intending to argue at a later date the agent's fraud in acquiring the commission. On
its facts Metropolitan Bank, supra, was a reasonable enough decision, but the problem
of Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, supra note 79, was on a different point and properly
involved different reasoning. Certainly there is no evidence that any member of the
Metropolitan Bank court was thinking of anything other than the limitation issue.
81. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, supra note 79, at 15.
82. Id. at 10. He based this conclusion on Morrison v. Thompson, L.R. 9 Q.B. 480
(1874), not on the words of Bowen, L.J., in Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v.
Ansell, 39 Ch. D. 339 (1888) to which he made no reference.
83. 3 M. & S. 562, 105 Eng. Rep. 721 (K.B. 1815).
84. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, supra note 79, at 9.
85. Cotton, L.J., agreed with his own judgment in the Metropolitan Bank case, and
Lindley, L. J., decided that the relationship was one of debtor and creditor, and




mind," he had said, "that that liability is a debt only differing from
ordinary debts in the fact that it is merely equitable.. .... 6
This view of the nature of P's rights has caused trouble ever since.
First of all, there is an action at law and an action in equity, and be-
cause they entirely duplicate each other, and are based on the same
broad equity of which Lord Mansfield spoke in Moses v. Macferlan87
the courts have found little incentive to analyse either precisely.
After all, the rightness of P's recovery is self-evident. Second, the
objection that A cannot be a constructive trustee of the proceeds of
the bribe or illicit commission until a decree of the court has been
made because to do otherwise would confuse ownership and obliga-
tion, strikes at the whole basis of preventing unjust enrichment. There
may indeed be debate as to whether the trust arises at the moment
of the wrongful acquisition, or at the time of the court decree with
retrospective effect to the moment of wrongful acquisition; but it
is preposterous that the inevitable time lag before a decree can be
gained should allow a known dishonest agent to put the known pro-
ceeds of ill-doing beyond the limits of traceability. No procedure is
justifiable which allows such timely dissipation to occur. Yet, due
to the confusion over the nature of the equitable rights, this objec-
tion has never clearly been stated, least of all in the House of Lords.
In Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell in 1888, eight
years after Metropolitan Bank, and two years before Lister v. Stubbs,0
Lord Justice Bowen said that the action for money had and received
to P's use certainly lay to recover a secret bonus, but the use arose
from the relation of principal and agent.90
It is because it is contrary to equity that the agent or the servant should
retain money so received without the knowledge of his master. Then the
law implies a use, that is to say, there is an implied contract, if you put it
as a legal proposition-there is an equitable right, if you treat it as a matter
of equity-as between the principal and agent that the agent should pay it
over, which renders the agent liable to be sued for money had and re-
ceived, and there is an equitable right in the master to receive it, and to
take it out of the hands of the agent, which gives the principal a right to
relief in equity.9 1
86. Metropolitan Bank v. Heiron, supra note 80, at 323.
87. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
88. Supra note 82. In this case Kekewich J. and the Court of Appeals made a
finding of fraud.
89. Supra note 78.
90. In the court below Kekewich J. appears to have taken the view that the
action for money had and received would not lie. Money gained by secret bonus
could not have been received to the principal's use. Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice
Co. v. Ansell, supra note 82, at 345.
91. Id. at 367-68. Cotton and Fry, L.J.J. do not discuss this point.
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Were the legal and equitable actions, whatever the character of the
latter, both dependent on the fiduciary relationship? Even if there
were privity between P and A sufficient to enable the legal action to
be brought, the action at law achieved nothing less than the action
in equity, if, which is not clear, Lord Justice Bowen conceived of the
latter as personal onlyY2
It was in Metropolitan Bank in 1880 that the "equitable right" was
dubbed the right to compel payment of an equitable debt. This view
stuck. It was adopted in Lister v. Stubbs in 1890, and in Powell &
Thomas v. Evan Jones & Co.93 in 1904. The Court of Appeal there felt
bound to say that Lister v. Stubbs had negatived Ps right to make A a
trustee of his nondisclosed contractual right to receive future com-
missions from the third party, and discussed the matter no further. In
Attorney-General v. Goddard,94 where the Crown was seeking by
English information to recover bribes received by a police sergeant
who had been charged with the task of making certain enquiries,
Rowlatt J. had no doubt that Metropolitan Bank, the Boston Deep
Sea Fishing case, and Lister v. Stubbs had "conclusively" estab-
lished that these bribes might be recovered as an equitable debt.
"Therefore, if it is an equitable debt," he said, "there must be an
equitable remedy, and as far as I know the equitable remedy of the
Crown is by way of English information....-95
Moreover, Rowlatt J. had difficulty with whether the action for
money had and received was available. In the Metropolitan Bank
case both Lord Justice James and Lord Justice Brett had held9 that
such an action would not lie where P had never owned the bribe
moneys. In the Boston Deep Sea Fishing case, and without referring
to the earlier view of Lords Justices James and Brett, Lord Justice
Bowen held, as we have seen, that the action did lie, it being "con-
trary to equity" that A should retain such money without P's knowl-
edge. In the Goddard case, Rowlatt J. followed the two earlier
judges and held there was no action at law, though he had just quoted
Lord Justice Bowen's remarks! So there was room for confusion here,
too.
In Reading v. Attorney-GeneraP7 in 1951, more difficulties occurred.
Military authorities had seized sums which Sergeant Reading had
received as a result of lending his uniformed presence to certain
92. Bowen, L.J., made no reference to the views of James, L.J., in the Metropolitan
Bank case, views probably held by each member of that court.
93. [1905] 1 K.B. 11.
94. 98 L.J.K.B. 743 (1929).
95. Id. at 746.
96. Supra note 80, at 323 (James, L.J.), 324 (Brett, L.J.).
97. [19511 A.C. 507.
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nefarious traffickers in Cairo. His presence had prevented the search-
ing of trucks. Reading now sought by petition of right to recover
those moneys, and the three courts who heard the case were con-
cerned to determine whether the Crown would have been able to
recover from the sergeant the moneys in question. Denning J.
decided the case on simple unjust enrichment principles, holding that
the sergeant was not a fiduciary vis-h-vis the Crown.98
In the Court of Appeal,99 Lord Justice Asquith held that there was
a fiduciary relationship, and that, following Lord Justice Bowen in
the Boston Deep Sea Fishing case, the Crown could have recovered
the moneys either in an action for money had and received to the
Crown's use, or as an equitable debt. "Assuming a fiduciary relation
is necessary to enable the Crown to recover," he then held that there
was such a relation; "But we do not wish to be taken as holding that
if the fiduciary relation were absent the appeal [of the sergeant]
would necessarily succeed."100 And that was all. What was the nature
of this equitable remedy, which had so baffled Rowlatt J.? Why
were the moneys a debt only in this case, and not constructive trust
property? Because, while the Crown was in physical possession of
the moneys, no decree had yet been made? But then what kind of
finding of fraud on A's part is necessary? Did not the court in Read-
ing find fraud, and that the moneys were the produce of it? And, if
there had been no fiduciary relationship, was it the legal remedy that
would have been available to the Crown so that Reading's appeal
would still have had to be dismissed? As to the legal remedy, Lord
Justice Asquith could not understand, in view of Lord Justice
Bowen's later and contrary remarks, why Rowlatt J. had adopted
the views of Lord Justices Brett and James that the action for money
had and received would not lie. But Lord Justice Asquith added no
more insight on the merits of the dispute.
In the House of Lords, Lord Porter thought the fiduciary relation-
ship not essential in order to substantiate the Crown's claim, "but
another ground for succeeding where a claim for money had and
received would fail."101 But how would the legal claim, without the
principal/agent relationship, 02 get on its feet; especially in view of the
98. Reading v. The King, [1948] 2 K.B. 268. Lord Porter in the House of Lords,
Reading v. Attorney General, supra note 97, at 514, thought that this was not the
"essence" of Denning J.'s judgment.
99. Reading v. The King, [1949] 2 K.B. 232 (C.A.).
100. Id. at 238.
101. Reading v. Attorney General, supra note 97, at 516.
102. Lord Porter said, "It is true that the right of the master to demand payment
of the money is often imputed to a promise implied from his relationship to the
servant. I doubt whether it is necessary to raise such an implication in order to show
that the money has been received to the master's use ...." Ibid.
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controversy between Lord Justices Brett and James on one side and
Lord Justice Bowen on the other? And what are the circumstances
in which the learned judge contemplates a failure? Does he mean
for procedural reasons or on the merits of the claim? His lordship
otherwise agreed with the Court of Appeal, quoted Lord Justice
Bowen's words in the Boston Deep Sea Fishing case, and made no
reference to Lister v. Stubbs. Lord Normand was not convinced the
Crown would have succeeded in money had and received, but felt
the fiduciary obligation of Reading to the Crown required him to give
up all profits and advantages. Lord Oaksey agreed with the Court
of Appeals, thought there was nothing to prevent an implied promise
by the servant to restore from coming into existence, and said nothing
about remedies. Lord Radcliffe simply concurred with the Court of
Appeal.
Hosts of questions arise from all this, as we have seen. But the
most important for present purposes concern the equitable right. If
Lord Justice James was wrong in Metropolitan Bank in saying the
money had and received action would not lie, was his other view cor-
rect that there existed prior to the court decree merely an "equitable
debt"? In his inconclusive remarks on the "equitable right" in the
Boston Deep Sea Fishing case, Lord Justice Bowen says nothing of
Lord Justice James' remarks. Do we construe his agreement with Lord
Justice James from his concurrence in Lister v. Stubbs? Rowlatt J.
had repeated the words, "equitable debt," in Goddard, as had Lord
Justice Asquith in Reading, but neither examined the point, and Lord
Porter in Reading merely adopted Lord Justice Bowen's "equitable
right" words. So we are left with the authority of Metropolitan Bank
and of Lister v. Stubbs. Nothing has been said to shake the 1880
view that, prior to court judgment, P can claim only an equitable
debt from A who has accepted bribes or secret commissions.
10 3
What is this equitable action? As a claim for a debt, it must be
personal, and the oddities of the English information aside, it must
103. It is difficult to understand how Reading v. Attorney General, supra note 97,
can be said to have impaired the authority of Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, supra note 79.
Would that it did so. The Crown had control of Reading's money, the money clearly
constituted the proceeds of Reading's wrongdoings, and when Reading sought its return,
the courts asked themselves whether the Crown was entitled to it. I.e., had the
Crown a remedy with which it could have recovered the money? The answer was
yes, both at law and in equity. As to the remedy in equity, the writer cannot see
how Reading v. Attorney General, supra note 97, makes any advance on the position of
Bowen, L.J., in Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell, supra note 82, which
both the Court of Appeal and Lord Porter were content to accept. And, as we have
seen, Bowen, L.J., concurred in Lister v. Stubbs, supra note 79, two years after the
Boston Deep Sea Fishing case. Reading owed a debt to the Crown. The Crown won




be the action for an account. This action assumes the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. Is this what Lord Porter had in mind in Read-
ing when he referred to the fiduciary relationship? So is there still
a distinction in English law between ownership and obligation, as
Lord Justice Lindley said? It seems so. When, then, does the equit-
able proprietary interest of In re Diplock'0 come into existence?
This interest requires in English law the existence of a fiduciary re-
lationship, but that was what was held to be present in all the cases
under review, except Metropolitan Bank.
The truth is that English courts have not been required to think
out these questions. And the writer suggests that this general fog
of well-meaning equity will always overhang the legal remedies, pre-
venting them, too, from acquiring crisp, clear lines, unless we begin to
think in terms of the place of constructive trust and lien within the
general pattern of restitution remedies. It is difficult to see why we
should perpetuate the action for an account as a personal equitable
action to remedy unjust enrichment, but there may be a case for
the existence of a personal action in equity. If there is, then account
is available.
On the other hand, if we are to say that the the equitable right of
Metropolitan Bank and Reading v. Attorney-General is a constructive
trust, we are compelled to say that A is constructive trustee of a debt.
When the decree of the court fastens the duty to restore upon in
specie property, A becomes a constructive trustee of that property.
This result may stress the fact that from the moment of acquisition A
has an obligation to give up the secret commission arising out of his
unjust enrichment, possibly at P's expense, although it is doubtful
whether it does anything more. It creates a comprehensive claim,
but the nebulous sort of claim which English courts dislike. Further-
more, while no one doubts that an equitable obligation rests upon A
from the moment of acquisition, why is the remedy personal only
prior to judicial decree, and proprietary afterwards. There may have
been no fraud in the acquisition by A from a third party, yet we know
he has to disgorge that gain. 0-5 If there is no fraud, is the equitable
remedy then proprietary from the moment of gain? This seems odd.
Or is the point that the court has to give judgment decreeing that
the property claimed is in fact the gain which came to A from the
third party? This worried Rowlatt J. in Attorney General v. Goddard;
he was concerned that the police could seize and hold onto
moneys "belonging" to the constable on the suspicion only that that
104. [1948] Ch. 465 (C.A.).
105. Phipps v. Boardman, [1965J Ch. 992 (C.A. 1964). Stubbs had also used his
office to make a gain in the form of receipt from a third party. Lister v. Stubbs, supra
note 79.
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money was the consideration for his suppressing information he had
been detailed to collect. Of course, there was also the element that
the police had not proved the actual wrongdoing when they withheld
the fund. But both elements, proof of wrongdoing and ascertainment
of the property gained, were in Rowlatt's J. mind. What is the
answer to this situation? Is this the problem known to American courts
as the moment at which the constructive trust arises, 106 or is it some-
thing more fundamental-whether the constructive trust can arise
from obligation and not solely ownership-a problem which American
courts have solved? This is the kind of question with which we are
concerned, and it really seems as if we would be preventing this
question from being examined, rather than encouraging its solution,
if we were to sweep both the personal and the proprietary remedy
into the bag of the constructive trust.
B. A "Right" to Priority in Bankruptcy?
Indeed, it is doubtful also with such a comprehensive constructive
trust whether we would be encouraged to explore sufficiently the
question whether P ought to have a proprietary remedy which he
can employ in the insolvency of A. Professor Dawson wrote in 1951107
that American courts have been so fascinated with the tracing remedy
that they have been more concerned with discovering the equitable
proprietary interest and the "fictions" of tracing than with looking
at the injustices of enrichment as between claimant and defendant.
We in England employ a kind of constructive trust to remedy the
fiduciary's withholding of gain, and we permit tracing against or
through the fiduciary only. The tracing remedy, therefore, has not
yet taken on the significance for us which it has in the United States.
But we are now envisaging a broad and truly remedial constructive
trust, and hence we have to ask ourselves how we are to avoid the
mechanical approach to tracing which Professor Dawson deplores.
That we have seen the danger of losing sight of the defendant's
equities was evidenced by the Court of Appeals' approach in In re
Diplock.108 The court there was leaning over backwards to limit the
proprietary claims of the next of kin against the innocent charities.
A good deal has been written on the results produced by the court,10 9
but for our purpose it is noteworthy that the effort to limit the claims
was made.
106. 4 Scott, TRusTs § 462.4 (1939).
107. DAwsom, UNJuST ENmCmmENT 28 (1951).
108. Supra note 104, aff'd sub nom. Ministry of Health v. Simpson, [1951] A.C.
251.
109. The latest comment is in GOFF & JONES, RESTIUTON 42-56 (1966).
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In the writer's view, then, we need a vivid proprietary constructive
trust remedy for two reasons: (1) to get us away from express trust
analogy and "ownership" so that we no longer allow the trust only
against the fiduciary if he has made away with money "owned" by
the claimant. And in this connection we have to cease asking our-
selves how many duties of an express trustee the particular fiduciary
has. That seems simply irrelevant; (2) to permit further consideration
of the merits of the claimant's right to trace. When the plaintiff
claims funds, as he normally does, we want to ask: should he be able
to invoke a constructive trust? This focuses the question of whether
this claimant should have priority over the general creditors of the
insolvent defendant, over the solvent third party, or over the general
creditors of that third party. It is the focusing of the tracing claim
which is surely the vital need at this stage in English law. Our ap-
proach to the merits, whether and to what extent we are going to allow
tracing, is, though vital, a later and independent matter.
Assuming, then, that the constructive trust should be the means
of enforcing specific restitution, should the right to specific restitution,
provided the claimant can ascertain his property or its product, be
unaffected by the financial position or character of the defendant?
The defendant may be the immediately benefited party or his trans-
feree. The immediately benefited party may be insolvent, and the
fight may therefore be between the claimant and the general creditors.
The transferee may know of the circumstances of the immediate
acquisition, or know nothing. Knowing nothing at the time of the
transfer, he may later have learned the truth and yet have gone
ahead in his dealings with the acquired property. The transferee
may have given value for the property acquired, or he may be a
donee.
There is no magical inevitability in the process of tracing, and there
is obviously no reason why the claimant who, according to the present
rules, can ascertain his property in others' hands, should for that
reason alone be able to recover it. But in distinguishing between the
kinds of parties who may be found with the property or its product,
the Restatement seems fairly to come to terms with this problem of
balancing the equities between claimant and defendant. Moreover,
even where a constructive trust or equitable lien is imposed by the
Restatement or by existing precedents in the various American juris-
dictions,110 the miscellany of defences open to the constructive trustee
constitutes a formidable weapon to protect him from an overly burden-
some duty to restore.
An English lawyer looking at the American scene, however, may
110. 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 474-81 (1939).
M20 [ VOL. 19
ENGLISH CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
still find himself with reservations. He may be concerned with the
position of the general creditors vis-a'-vis the claimant, or be hesitant
to lend his support to a truly remedial constructive trust lest it should
be absorbed with the mathematics of tracing at the expense of weigh-
ing of the relative merits between particular claimants and defendants.
And in this regard his fears are underlined when he further reads Pro-
fessor Dawson's Rosenthal lectures of 1951. Having explained that
tracing is "the most important contribution of the modern constructive
trust,"'u Professor Dawson points out that the extension of the con-
structive trust in 1877 to reach the product of the larcenous act "clearly
marks the transformation of the constructive trust into a generalized
remedial device, with tracing as its most prominent feature,""2 capable
of dealing with acquisition by fraud, undue influence, duress or simple
breach of contract. He goes on,
Since the remedy was labeled constructive trust it was thought to follow in-
evitably that all the machinery of tracing must likewise be transferred. Each
extension seemed right and almost inevitable, on a narrow view of each case.
The extensions, added together, have given us something new. In the very
short space of seventy-five years we have created a monster.
113
Should the plaintiff have a right to elect whether he will sue for a
monetary judgment representing the amount of the enrichment or
for an order of specific restitution on the grounds that he can trace
his property or its proceeds? There are many forms of unjust en-
richment which find a remedy under the head of remedial constructive
trust. Should all those forms entitle the plaintiff to recover specific
property against a solvent defendant?" 4
Should the common law or statutory lienor over a specific property,
which is subject to a constructive trust claim, take his place behind
the constructive trustee because the trustee can show that the wrong-
doer's act was done before the lien attached? Or should the lienor
have priority because the constructive trust only arises on an order
of the court, and the constructive trustee, though he advanced money
as a result of fraudulent inducement, could have protected himself
by taking a common law lien on the property in question? In Inter-
national Refugee Organization v. Maryland Drydock Co.," 5 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided the second question in the
affirmative; the constructive trustee did not get any priority. Clearly
111. DAwsoN, UNJUST ENIUcMENT 27 (1951).
112. Id. at 28.
113. Id. at 30.
114. See Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 136 N.W. 861 (1912).
115. 179 F.2d 284 (1950). Followed in Papazian v. American Steel & Wire Co.,
155 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
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the court felt that the International Refugee Organization had largely
itself to blame in advancing money without the security of a lien. It
is the same attitude which convinces many English lawyers that
Lister v. Stubbs is correct. The "equitable right" before and after
the judicial decree is properly a very different creature. The reply
comes again, though, that if it is the injustice of the wrongdoer's gain
that gives rise to the "equitable right" before decree is made, as well
as the trust obligation after the decree is made, why should the
plaintiff claimant have no right to trace before decree, but be able
to trace afterwards. Is not this equally arbitrary?
Then there are policy questions, familiar to the American lawyer.
For example, should the constructive trustee succeed against the
homestead, a right denied to the general creditor? Should the con-
structive trustee be able to claim the proceeds of an insurance policy
on the life of the enriched party, when the claimant's money has been
used to purchase the policy? The policy may be in favor of wife and
children of the enriched party, which raises some of the same policy
considerations as the homestead issue. And there are more technical
policy questions. Should the negligence of the claimant in parting
with his property affect his right against the benefited party's general
creditors? Should the right to trace vary with the mode of depriva-
tion? If all the answers are in the affirmative, the Restatement rules
would need some amendment to meet policies along these lines.
On the other hand, should the express trustee be barred from
pleading a limitation period, while the constructive trustee, whatever
his degree of wrongdoing, can plead it? At the moment this escape
route from liability is open to the constructive trustee, but little if
any thought has been given to why this should be so. Part of the
answer in England lies in the fact that the constructive trust grew
in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a country
cousin of the express trust. No one thought of the constructive trust
as being of equal importance to the clear and significant express trust,
and it was not until the three last quarters of the nineteenth century
that it appeared there were equally good reasons for barring some
fiduciaries from pleading limitation periods. Certainly there was a good
reason if all express trustees were barred. The result, as I have argued
elsewhere, 116 was a constant juggling act by the courts with the ]an-
gauge of the statute, and with earlier decisions. Some constructive
trustees were barred from pleading the statute; others were not. In
order that desired results on the particular occasion might be achieved,
the courts developed a fine art in finding reasons for following some
precedents and distinguishing others. Here, too, we have clear
116. WVATERs, op. cit. supra note 80, at 292-321.
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policy decisions before us for consideration at the same time as we
attempt to fashion the fully remedial constructive trust. And the pages
of Scott suggest that these policy decisions still have to be faced to
some extent in the United States, where work with the constructive
trust is so much more advanced.
Professor Dawson's comment, then, exactly represents the reaction
of many English lawyers to talk of a remedial constructive trust. The
constructive trust seems to them to be adjectival, rather than inher-
ently remedial. It is a description of a result, not a remedy. To those
who would see a fully remedial trust, indeed, this may be why they
would employ the term to cover all equitable relief to prevent unjust
enrichment. The real trouble behind English conservatism, however,
may well be that while the remedying of unjust enrichment is an
avowed and reputable doctrine in the United States, there is still in
England, despite a few noteworthy exceptions, a judicial reluctance
to admit to the existence of such a rubric. If you cannot bring your-
self to accept that there is such a branch of liability as opposed to a
mere tenet of moral jurisprudence, then it is unlikely that your con-
structive trust will move far from merely applying to fiduciaries
some of the duties of express trustees. No one can doubt that the
obligation of a man not to allow his interest to conflict with his
duty is a fundamental idea in any system of law. Equity lawyers
merely applied the time-old principle to the express trustee. They
developed it in English law by applying it to the express trustee,
but there was no need for the principle to be applied generally
throughout English law through the express trust rules.117 It naturally
happened in that way because express trust precedents were at hand.
The analogy to the express trust was too obvious for the extension
of the rule to fiduciaries to come in any other way. And in any case
Equity cornered the award of relief to abused fiduciaries.
The application of the rule to fiduciaries is sometimes not desirable,
however. The conflict-of-interest-and-duty rule is very strictly ap-
plied in Equity in order to deter trustees from acts which may be
both difficult to discover and hard to prove, as well as being in total
opposition to the idea of the trust. Now it may be very sound to use
the rule as a deterrent device where express trustees are concerned.
It may well discourage trustees from the slightest questionable deal
if they know that, whatever their justification and even if they are
totally in good faith, they will have to account for any gain that comes
to them personally. But this policy does not necessarily apply when
one is not dealing with the express trustee. For one thing there is a
117. Stoljar is of the view that in fact equity played a limited role in developing
the doctrine of accountability. STOLJAR, QuAsi-CoNRmcrT 82 (1964).
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wide range of fiduciaries, 118 only some of whom could be expected
to show or need show the trustee's utter exclusion of self in any form.
So the deterrent policy is irrelevant on this ground. For another
thing, the object of an unjust enrichment doctrine is to allocate bene-
fits between claimant and defendant. Unlike the express trust, where
punitive measures may be justifiable, the constructive trust is not
concerned with such matters. And it is a remedy, not a trust institu-
tion. There is much force in the argument that Regal (Hastings), Ltd.
v. Gulliver19 was altogether too severe in its result, and harmful in
its meaning for the company director's freedom of movement in con-
ducting the business of his company. One can well understand the
recent contrary view of the British Columbia Court of Appeals in
Peso Silver Mines, Ltd. v. Cropper.20
Many English lawyers, in short, see only a vague equitable principle
in the term "constructive trust," and they fear the evolution of a
"monster" on their own shores. Professor Dawson thinks that "with-
out much conscious purpose or plan [Americans] have created this
shambling creature. It is time to fence it in." 21 Most English lawyers,
if they see any case for change, would like to fence as they go. So
far as the remedy should have a clear proprietary character, and be
a claim to specific restitution, I think they are right. But how the
law experiments with the constructive trust, which it must, works
out its policy judgments, and fences-all at the same time-is a co-
nundrum we have yet to start seriously discussing. I suspect that
where my Law Quarterly Review critic and I differ is that, with a
single jurisdiction22 and a bench not noted for its radicalism, he
would like English law to experiment and work out its policies, while
I think the time has already come for some fencing.
118. The words of Asquith, L.J., and Lord Porter in Reading v. Attorney General,
supra note 97, make the fiduciary category have largely unforeseeable width. A recent
example of this width is provided by the reasoning of Sheppard, J.A., in Morrison v.
Coast Fin., Ltd., 55 D.L.R.2d 710, 722-26 (B.C.C.A. 1966).
119. [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.). The decision is criticized in GowEn, MOnEnu
ComPANY LAW 486-88 (2d ed. 1957).
120. 54 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) (B.C.C.A. 1965).
121. DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 33 (1951).
122. For present purposes the Scottish jurisdiction is omitted.
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